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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER BABY M: HOW
RULES CAN BRING CERTAINTY TO THE
WORLD OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Christopher Bailey *
When the legislature creates a law, that law becomes a legal
directive. 1 Legal directives guide decision making—making it easier,
improving the quality of the decision, and limiting the blatant discretion
of the decision maker. 2 The form legal directives take, such as rules and
standards, can have a direct impact on this discretion. 3 This article will
present the differences between rules and standards as legal directives in
the context of its application to surrogacy contracts. Part I will introduce
rules and standards, and the basic characteristics of each. Part II will
discuss some of the general arguments for and against both rules and
standards. Part III will introduce the concept of the surrogacy contract
and three different approaches to this type of contract—prohibition based
on a standard of public policy as announced in In Re Baby M, 4 both
regulation and prohibition through rules suggested in the Uniform
Parentage Act, 5 and regulation through judicial standards as created in
Johnson v. Calvert. 6 Finally, Part IV will discuss why the surrogacy
contract may be better suited for rule-based regulation than standards.

J.D. 2013 Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. University of
South Florida. The author would like to thank Erin Myers, Regan Shikada, Maria
Hendrickson for all their hard work.
1 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57
(1992).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter Baby M].
5 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Parentage Act (2000).
6 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
*
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PART I: RULES AND STANDARDS DEFINED
A. Rules
Rules are generally associated with legal formality. 7 Rules are
designed to limit the decision maker’s response and to confine the
decision to the facts without reference to arbitrary or subjective
reasoning. 8 Rules take into account background social policies, such as
fairness and injustice, and attempt to create a directive that can be
followed on a consistent basis while, at the same time, addressing these
policies. 9 However, rules are not perfect. The formality involved
inevitably creates errors of over-and under-inclusiveness. 10 Thus, rules
have a cost: “sacrifice in precision in the achievement” of the underlying
social policy. 11 This is especially true in legal fields involving everchanging technology and social values. 12
Rules also reduce errors associated with judicial incompetence or
bias. 13 The value of the rule is in its independent force, which the
decision maker is bound to follow 14 The focus for the decision maker is
to fit the decision to the rule, even when doing so creates a result that
does not necessarily address the background social policy of the rule. 15
Rules will often employ categories to define brightline
boundaries. 16 Each situation is then classified as “falling on one side or
the other” of the brightline boundary. 17 An example of a rule used in the
field of family law is “[p]lacement of a child in an adoptive home may
not be delayed or denied on the basis of race, color or national origin.”18
In this example, the background social policy for the rule is fairness and
equal protection for the parents. The rule addresses this policy by setting
brightlines and, thus, reduces the discretion of the decision maker.
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Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58.
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 (citation omitted).
9 Id. (citations omitted).
10 Id.
11 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1689 (1976).
12 See infra Part II.A., IV.
13 Sullivan, supra note 1, at note 58..
14 Id. at 58.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 59.
17 Id.
18 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.005 (West 1985).
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B. Standards
In contrast to rules, standards are more concerned with applying
the decision to the background policy. 19 Standards give broader
directives, which in turn gives the decision maker broader authority to
make subjective decisions. 20 This broadening reduces errors of under-and
over-inclusiveness, however, it increases the chance for error based on
judicial incompetence or bias. 21 Standards allow the decision maker to
consider a totality of the circumstances rather than just the facts. 22 In a
legal system where two cases are rarely the same, this means that there is
less of a chance that the decision made in one case will be absolutely
followed in the next case. 23 Looking at the totality of the circumstances,
standards take a balancing approach in the consideration of all the
competing rights and interests, and weighs the rights and interests in
consideration of the background policy of the standard. 24
An example of a standard used in the field of family law is:
“[t]he provisions [related to adoption] shall be construed so as to
promote the best interests and welfare of the child in recognition of the
entitlement of the child to a permanent and stable home.” 25 On its face,
this could seem like a rule. The words “shall be construed” direct the
decision maker’s focus; however, what is considered to be the “best
interests and welfare,” as well as what is a “permanent and stable home,”
are left undefined and up to judicial discretion.
It is important to note that rules and standards are not rigidly
defined. 26 For example, a rule can be so generalized that it becomes a
standard, and a standard can include so many directives that it becomes a
rule. Courts will often create standards from rules and vice versa. 27 Yet,
this simplified explanation does not take into account exceptions that
can, and do, exist, which further blur the distinctions between rules and
standards.
PART II: ARGUMENTS FOR RULES AND STANDARDS
The decision to frame a legal directive as a rule or standard will
have a significant impact on the ramifications of that directive, including
whether and how it will be applied by the decision maker.

Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 (citation omitted).
Id. at 59.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 59–60.
25 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.005 (West 1985).
26 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 57–58.
27 Michael Ambrosio, Reflections on the Appearance of Impropriety Standard, 273-DEC
N.J. LAW. 9, 12 (2011).
19
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A. Rules
There are two dominant advantages formal rules have over
standards. The first is fairness or “the restraint of official arbitrariness,”
and the second is “certainty.” 28 In addition, several arguments have been
made that support the framing of legal directives as rules, including
encouraging investment, efficiency, utility, and the advancement of
democracy. 29
Rules promote fairness by binding all decision makers, and
similar cases, alike. 30 Rules “narrow the range of factors to be
considered” which reduces arbitrary decisionmaking. 31 Arbitrary
decisions may take into account subjective factors existing outside the
facts or the purpose of the rule, such as corruption, paternalism, and
bias. 32 When standards are used, it allows the introduction of these
subjective factors, which can cloud the decision maker’s judgment and
prejudice their decision. 33 Rules negate these subjective factors by
restricting the decision maker from indulging their personal preferences,
giving the appearance that he or she is rendering a neutral decision. 34
“[T]he appearance of equal treatment…[a]s a motivating force of the
human spirit…cannot be overestimated.” 35 Rules are better for providing
the appearance of justice as seen through the lens of equal protection. 36
When two cases are decided differently, it is important “not only that the
later case be different, but that it be seen to be so” for the system of
justice to be respected. 37 Rules clearly define the difference in these
cases. For example, a law that prohibits “payment for services” clearly
does not pertain to “services provided without payment.” By having a
“clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to” the decision
maker has a reference point to explain the disparity in their decisions—
one case fell under the rule while the other did not.38 Further, by relying
on a rule, the decision maker is free to make unpopular decisions that
may be contrary to the popular will. For example, it is easier for a judge
to strike down a contract because the legislature has deemed it illegal
than to explain why it runs counter to his notion of public policy.
Standards do not have this reference point. With standards, justice, as
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688.
See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62–64.
30 Id. at 62.
31 Id. at 62-64 (citations omitted).
32 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688.
33 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59.
34 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989).
35 See Id. at 1178.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
28
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fairness, is defined by the decision maker, and that explanation may not
sit well with one seeking equal treatment under the law.
The reduction of arbitrary decisions creates certainty in the law
that cannot be understated. The concept of stare decisis dominates
judicial decision making by creating certainty. 39 As Justice Scalia stated,
“when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule,
and say, “[t]his is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower
courts, I constrain myself as well.” 40 Rules can do the same. “Even in
simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the
Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law
must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.” 41 When parties to a
contract know the legal ramifications of their actions ahead of time, they
can adjust their actions accordingly. 42 In addition, certainty helps the
government promote desired behavior and encourages individuals to act
with the confidence that his or her actions will not be “subject to
sporadic legal catastrophe.” 43 In contrast, the uncertainty of standards
causes “some citizens to unknowingly violate the law and…chill[s] some
desirable behavior on the part of citizens who unknowingly overcomply
with the law.” 44 As it pertains to contracts, when rules are clear on
enforceability or unenforceability, people gain confidence, which results
in the development or shutting down of new markets. 45 Although the
result that the rule creator wishes to occur is inconsequential to this
argument, the most important point is that the parties can act with
confidence in the decision of whether or not to pursue a contract.
In conjunction with certainty comes predictability, which
promotes investment. 46 The greater the probability that the decision
maker will respond as expected, the more the parties will invest in
communicating their intentions to the decision maker. 47 Thus, “rules
encourage transactions in general.” 48 So long as private parties desire to
engage in certain actions, the legal system should encourage investment
39 Stare decisis is “[t]he doctrine of precendent, under which a court must
follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 672 (3d pocket ed. 2006). This
doctrine creates certainty because the court must render similar decisions in
similar cases.
40 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179.
41 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179.
42 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1688–89.
43 Id. at 1689.
44 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 46 (2000) (citation omitted).
45 Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67, 80 (2007).
46 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1697.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1698.

prior to the occurrence of the action. 49 One could argue that standards
discourage transactions, so, if a legislature wanted to prohibit certain
activity, it should adopt standards rather than rules and inject uncertainty
into the market. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, clear
rules that prohibit the activity would better discourage transactions than
unclear standards. Second, “transactions” and “investments,” as used
here, are not necessarily business deals, contract formation, or monetary
investments. Transactions and investments can simply be information
seeking activities. If a clear rule prohibits an activity and the party still
wants to engage in that activity, the rule encourages the party to seek out
other venues where that activity is not prohibited. A standard on the
other hand might suggest it is acceptable to engage in the activity even
though that was not the legislature’s intent. Additionally, with standards
there is little incentive to take precautions if the outcome will ultimately
be left to the whim of the decision maker because standards “‘chill’
private activity by making its consequences less certain.” 50 Also, there is
less danger from not taking precautions because of the chance that the
judge will correct the parties’ mistakes. 51 When parties engage in
contractual obligations, especially ones that have large monetary and
emotional investments, encouraging caution is vital. Thus, “there are
times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.” 52
As a result of inherent certainty, rules promote efficiency in the
justice system. 53 When the parties know the likely outcome of litigation
ahead of time, the parties are less apt to rely on litigation as a remedy. 54
If litigation is involved, rules work to keep the decision maker focused
on the facts at hand and discourage timely and costly fact-finding
missions. 55
From a utility standpoint, “rules necessarily produce greater net
social welfare gains than do standards.” 56 Certainty allows the parties to
plan accordingly and productively. 57 Conversely, standards create
uncertainty that discourages productive planning. 58
Finally, rules promote the democratic system and enforce the
inherent separation of powers established by the Constitution. 59 The
legislature is charged with enacting laws and, in doing so, it is required
Id.
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1698.
51 See Id. at 1697.
52 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1179.
53 See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1689.
54 Id. at 1688–89.
55 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63.
56 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Id. at 64–65.
49
50

to give guidance to those branches that will enforce or interpret the law. 60
When statutes are created that contain “rules of inadequate clarity or
precision,” those statutes are criticized as “undemocratic” and possibly
“unconstitutional—because they leave too much to be decided by persons
other than the people's representatives.” 61 The same can be said of
standards. If too much discretion is left in the hands of a judge, it allows
for “legislating from the bench,” which has been highly criticized as
undemocratic. 62
Rules are not without criticism. One criticism is that rules may
force the decision maker to treat cases that are similar in terms of the
background policy differently because a specific distinction the rule
provides for exists. 63 The use of more generalized rules can reduce this
occurrence. 64 Another criticism of rules is that in the real world, when
real parties are involved, the only way rules work is if the parties actually
know about, and respond to, the rules, which is not always the case. 65
The parties may be unable to learn about the rules because of the
investment cost, or because they are unwilling to follow the rule because
it is unenforced. 66 Yet another criticism is that rules are often so rigid the
judiciary is unwilling to “bite the bullet” and enforce the rules. 67 Some
judges are unwilling to accept the consequence the rule demands. 68 At
that point, judges will often look for counter rules that nullify the rule in
question, or simply recast the rule as a standard and balance the
circumstances. 69
While rules are not perfect, the benefit of fairness is seen as
outweighing these limitations, and is often preferred to the potential for
bias and arbitrary decisionmaking that accompanies standards. 70 In the
adoption of rules, the creator of the legal directive favors “the judgment
that the danger of unfairness from official arbitrariness or bias is greater
than the danger of unfairness from the arbitrariness that flows from the
grossness of rules.” 71

82 C.J.S. Statutes § 10.
Scalia, supra note 34, at 1176.
62 See Id. at 1176–77.
63 Id.
64 See generally Scalia, supra note 24 (urging courts not to rely upon “overarching
generalizations” in order to leave “considerable room for future judges” to make his or
her own determination based upon the facts of the case).
65 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1699 (citation omitted).
66 Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1698–99 (citation omitted).
67 Id. at 1701.
68 Id. at 1700–1701.
69 Id. at 1700.
70 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62.
71 Id.
60
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B. Standards
As the law has evolved there has been a tendency to replace
standards with rules; however, this approach “exalts the letter of the law
at the expense of its spirit.” 72 Looking then to the spirit of the law, the
same arguments that are made for the application of rules can be applied
to standards as well—standards promote fairness, flexibility, utility,
equality, accountability, and transparency. 73
While rules create fairness by ignoring factual differences and
treating everyone the same, standards create fairness by recognizing
factual differences and treating substantively similar situations the
same. 74 Standards are similar to the common law approach, which allows
the law to grow “not through the pronouncement of general principles,
but case-by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.” 75 This
case-by-case approach limits over-and under-inclusiveness, which is one
of the biggest advantages of standards. 76 As noted above, no rule is
perfect and “every rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” 77
“[I]t is not possible to create a system of rules that covers every form of
wrong or right.” 78 Forcing decision makers to fit every situation into a
rule inevitably results in cases where the underlying social policy and the
individuals involved are “sacrificed on the altar of rules.” 79 Standards
solve this problem by looking to outside factors to find dissimilar cases
alike. 80
It can also be argued that standards maximize productivity better
than rules. 81 The utility of a standard is in its flexibility. 82 Rigid rules
become obsolete over time—if a rule defines something and that
something changes, the rule loses its value. 83 As a result, it could be
argued that the decision maker in such a case may be forced to take
action that does not maximize productivity because he or she is bound by
the outdated rule. Conversely, standards allow the decision maker to
adapt to these changed circumstances to ensure that productivity is still
maximized. 84
72

Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15.
See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62–64 (explaining the arguments that are made for the
application of rules).
74 Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
559, 564 (2010).
75 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1177.
76 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59.
77 Scalia, supra note 34, at 1177.
78 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15.
79 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Morse, supra note 74, at 565 (citation omitted).
84 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
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In addition to becoming obsolete, the static nature of rules
creates incentives for exploitation. 85 For example, crafty individuals who
are educated in the rules may find ways to work around the rules at the
expense of the uneducated. Standards give the decision maker the
authority to step in on the side of the “fools” and protect them from
“sharp dealers” who have the resources to exploit these brightline rules. 86
This raises the argument regarding equal treatment. Standards
may serve equality better by discouraging the kind of manipulation that
goes on in trying to work around rules. 87 Individuals tend to interpret
ambiguous information in ways that benefit himself or herself. 88 Hence,
unsuspecting citizens may fall prey to those individuals who try to
manipulate an ambiguous standard in his or her favor. However, the very
nature of the standard allows a judge, not bound by a rigid rule, to
redistribute the imbalance in favor of the unsuspecting citizen. 89 In this
way, utility is again maximized.
Standards create accountability by affirming—rather than
denying—responsibility. 90 The argument that rules allow a decision
maker to lean on an established pillar for his or her decision also works
against the rules. 91 Rules encourage the decision maker to abdicate
responsibility, whereas standards force the decision maker to explain his
or her decision. 92 Standards put the decisionmaking process out into the
open for all to scrutinize, which makes the decision makers more
accountable. 93 The decision maker is prevented from “passing the buck
and claiming to be applying a neutral rule[.]” 94 This also decreases the
chance for bias to be used by the decision makers in the reasoning
process, which is a major criticism of standards. 95 If the decision maker
knows his or her “predispositions [will be] subject…to the test of
reason,” he or she will be less likely to rely on such predispositions.96
This accountability forces the decision maker to act carefully,
judiciously, and rationally in the pursuit of justice. 97
Just as rules have been argued to promote democracy, so too
have standards. The establishment of legal directives is often a balancing
See Id.
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
87 Id. at 67.
88 Korobkin, supra note 44, at 46 (citation omitted).
89 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
90 Id. at 69.
91 See Id. at 67.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 67–68.
94 Morse, supra note 74, at 566 (citation omitted).
95 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62.
96 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 68 (citing Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1962)).
97 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 16.
85
86

test of competing ideas, elements, and factors. 98 Just as politicians must
consider the effect of legal directives on their constituents, standards
force the decision maker to consider the common good. 99
Standards promote the value of society better than rules. The
flexibility of standards preserves the integrity of the law. 100 The integrity
of the law depends on the ability of a judge to take into account the
social policies of justice, fairness, and due process, and to ensure that a
situation is decided fairly. 101 Rules separate law and morality, which
hinders the judge’s ability in this respect. 102 Standards, which take in a
much broader picture of society and examine a greater number of factors,
are better suited for promoting social values. 103
Finally, standards are beneficial to the “losers” as well as the
“winners” because of the transparency that must accompany a decision
based on standards. 104 Accordingly, the explanation that accompanies a
standard helps clarify why a case was decided the way that it was, more
so than, “you didn’t follow the rules.” This transparency also promotes
dialogue that can be crucial to advancing social issues. The decision in In
Re Baby M, discussed below, was based on a public policy standard and
it started a nationwide dialogue on surrogacy contracts that would last for
years. 105
The biggest criticism of standards is the potential for introducing
legal error. 106 Things like paternalism, corruption, prejudice, bias, as well
as personal education and experience are always lurking in the
background. 107 However, for those in favor of standards, this danger is
justified by the possibility of more substantively accurate
decisionmaking. 108
PART III: SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Surrogacy contracts govern the relationship created between two
parties—a surrogate mother and a person who wants to have a child
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Sullivan, supra note 1, at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
100 Ambrosio, supra note 28, at 15 (citing DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 223 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1986))..
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
104 Id. at 69.
105 See infra Part III.A.
106 Morse, supra note 74, at 564 (citation omitted).
107 See generally Arthur, L. Corbin, The Interpretations of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965) (noting decisions are formed by and wholly based on
the personal education and experience of the decision maker regardless of their attempts
to focus on the issue at hand).
108 Morse, supra note 74, at 564 (citation omitted).
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through surrogacy. 109 A surrogate mother is a woman who has agreed to
conceive and carry the child of another person. 110 There are two major
types of surrogacy—traditional and gestational surrogacy. 111 Traditional
surrogacy:
[R]efers to a contractual situation whereby a woman agrees to
become impregnated, typically by artificial insemination (AI), using her
own egg and the sperm of another man, usually the intended father of the
baby. She agrees to carry the child to term and thereafter relinquish her
parental rights to the child. Because the surrogate uses her own egg, she
is considered the biological, genetic and gestational mother of the
resulting child. 112
Gestational surrogacy refers to a contractual situation whereby the
arrangement with the intended father is the same as in traditional
surrogacy; however, the egg is provided by the intended mother or by a
third party. 113 No genetic link exists between the surrogate and the child,
even though the surrogate is the child’s birth mother. 114 This is also
known as “host” surrogacy. 115 As in traditional surrogacy, the gestational
surrogate also agrees to relinquish her parental rights to the child. 116
Because gestational surrogacy can provide a genetic connection to the
child for both parents, it is desired over traditional surrogacy as well as
over adoption. 117 Currently, an estimated ninety-five percent of all
surrogacies are gestational surrogacies. 118
There is no federal law in the United States that governs
surrogacy; thus, regulation is accomplished at the state level, if it is
addressed at all. 119 In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved an updated Uniform Parentage Act

NEW
WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Surrogacy&oldid=938980 (last
visited Apr. 30, 2013).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, Council for Responsible Genetics, 6
(2010),
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJ0A1M.pdf.
113 RESOLVE, THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, http://www.resolve.org/familybuilding-options/surrogacy.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
114 Id.
115 New World Encyclopedia, supra note 109.
116 Gugucheva, supra note 111, at 6.
117 See NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 109.
118 Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 Fam. Advoc.
32, 33 (2011).
119 Id. at 32.
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(“UPA”), which expressly addresses surrogacy contracts. 120 However,
only nine states have adopted the provisions of the UPA. 121
A. Baby M
Artificial Insmenination (AI) was available as far back as the
1950s. 122 However, it was not until the law regarding paternity caught up
to the technology that it became widely utilized. 123 This trend continued
as more couples began to look to AI as a way to have children even
though the law was slow to acknowledge the changing landscape. 124 The
increase in AI and the lack of regulation culminated in the seminal case
of Baby M that was decided in 1988. 125
In Baby M, Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to be a surrogate
carrier for Mr. and Mrs. Stern. 126 The parties lived in New Jersey, which
had no laws regarding surrogacy contracts at the time of the
agreement. 127 Yet, a surrogacy contract was drafted and signed by the
parties. 128 However, after the baby was born, Mrs. Whitehead changed
her mind and decided to keep the baby. 129 She fled to Florida and hid out
for three months before police forced her to return the child. 130 The case
eventually landed in front of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 131 The court
took strong issue with the fact that Mrs. Whitehead was paid for her
services as a surrogate and equated the contract with commercial
transactions, specifically “baby selling.” 132 The court found that the
contract disregarded the best interest of the child, exploited the surrogate,
and, ultimately, held that the contract was void for public policy.133 The
court used a “best-interest-of-the-child” standard to award custody to the
Sterns. 134

Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 5.
UNIFORM LAW COMM.: LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET – PARENTAGE ACT, available at
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (stating that
Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming have enacted the UPA; however, it is important to also note that Maine will be
introducing the UPA in 2013) (last accessed Apr. 30, 2013).
122 Sanger, supra note 45, at 80.
123 Id.
124 Sanger, supra note 45, at 80.
125 Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
126 Id. at 1235.
127 Id. at 1234–35.
128 Id. at 1235.
129 Id. at 1236–37.
130 Id. at 1237.
131 Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1238 (N.J. 1988).
132 Id. at 1241–42.
133 Id. at 1240–42.
134 Id. at 1263–64.
120
121

B. Moving Away from Baby M
The New Jersey Supreme Courts framing of Baby M as an
illegitimate commodification contrary to public policy had far-reaching
effects on legal regulation. 135 At the start of the case in 1987, no state
regulated surrogacy contracts. 136 However, in the years following the
case, many states enacted laws prohibiting or severely restricting
surrogacy agreements. 137 The biggest opponents lobbying against
surrogacy were religious groups, child-welfare advocates, feminists and
liberals. 138 The flourish of political activity that followed Baby M 139 was
dominated by activists who were pushing the anti-surrogacy
movement. 140 It was hoped that the movement would sweep the country;
however, like most movements that follow high-profile cases, interest
was hard to sustain and by the mid-1990s advocates had moved on to
different issues and legislative activity ceased. 141
As the political and social meaning of surrogacy contracts
changed, the initial hostility to these transactions diminished. 142 New
players have emerged in the world of surrogacy that have financial
interests at stake, the traditional notions of family structure have
changed, and advances in reproductive technology have contributed to
the change. 143.
Studies have now been conducted that refute the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s fears that impoverished women would be exploited; for
example, the transaction is now framed as “altruistic surrogates
(contractually bound and compensated nonetheless) provid[ing] the ‘gift
of life’ to deserving couples who otherwise would be unable to have
children.” 144 Surrogacy has become big business. An estimated ten
Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange:
Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110
(2009).
136 Id. at 117.
137 Scott, supra note 135, at 110 (citation omitted).
138 Id. at 118.
139 Id. at 117. It is important to note that before Baby M was even decided, twenty-seven
states had introduced bills regarding surrogacy and by the time the case was over, six
states had passed laws banning surrogacy contracts or declaring surrogacy contracts void.
Id.
140 Id. at 120.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 110.
143 Angie Godwin McEwen, So You're Having Another Woman's Baby: Economics and
Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 273 (1999).
144 Scott, supra note 135, at 110; See also CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS,
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/surrogates.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013)
(advising potential surrogates that “[g]estational [s]urrogacy allows a woman, like
yourself, to help [i]ntended [p]arents who could otherwise not have a family to fulfill that
dream.”);
THE
SURROGACY
EXPERIENCE,
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million women spend approximately three billion dollars every year in an
attempt to have a child through means such as AI. 145 This has further
contributed to the diminishing hostility towards the potential exploitation
of impoverished women. 146
One reason for the change has been the rise of gestational
surrogacy, which has eliminated the surrogate’s genealogical link to the
baby. 147 Another big reason for the change in attitudes has been the shift
in the groups advocating for surrogacy—feminist groups and civil
libertarians who started such advocacy in the 1980s, and argued against
surrogacyhave been replaced by attorneys and brokerswho have a greater
financial stake, and parents’ groups arguing for surrogacy today. 148 More
importantly, the early legislative action aimed at punishment and
prohibition has been replaced “by the pragmatic objective of providing
certainty about parental status and protecting all participants, especially
children.” 149 This is not to suggest that opposition no longer exists.
Social and religious conservatives still lobby against surrogacy and many
states have been reluctant to change its initial opposition to surrogacy.150
Consequently, the landscape of legal directives across the nation is “a
smattering of statutes and case law to which there appears to be no
rhyme or reason,” if there are any legal directives at all. 151
C. Current Legal Directives
The realm of surrogacy contracts is largely practiced at the
family law court level. 152 This is understandable as the issues largely deal
with traditional family law issues such as paternity, adoption, custody,
and parental rights. 153 Because family law is almost exclusively
governed by individual states, the law can vary greatly depending on the
state in which the contract is drafted. A recent fifty-state summary of
surrogacy law compiled for the American Bar Association showed that
twenty-eight states and Washington D.C. have statutory regulation in
(explaining that “[f]or many women, giving the gift of a child to another family can be a
deeply rewarding experience.”).
145 Gugucheva, supra note 112, at 26.
146 See Godwin McEwen, supra note 143, at 273.
147 Scott, supra note 100, at 121.
148 Id.
149 Id. (citation omitted).
150 Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
151 Hinson, supra note 118, at 32; See also Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State
Laws, supra note 5, at 68 ( explaining that a study in 2000 revealed that “eleven states
allow gestational agreements by statute or case law; six states void such agreements by
statute; eight states do not ban agreements per se, but statutorily ban compensation to the
gestational mother; and two states judicially refuse to recognize such agreements.”).
152 Hinson, supra note 118, at 32.
153 See generally Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (addressing various family law
issues in relation to the surrogacy contract).

place, or precedent case law, that touches on surrogacy contracts. 154 The
other twenty-two states exist in a legal “vacuum” where no statute or
published case exists regarding the interpretation of surrogacy
contracts. 155 Studies show that surrogacy is on the rise. For example, in
just four years, from 2004 to 2008, the number of children born to
gestational surrogates grew eighty-nine percent. 156
As more people turn to surrogacy as a viable childbearing
option, lawmakers have begun to realize the potential harms that are
posed by the lack of regulation. 157 The appropriate legal response is to
create legal directives that clearly establish parental status. 158 As noted
above, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved an updated UPA in 2000 to address technological
changes that had occurred since its inception. 159 Thus, the law for
determining the parents of children is modernized by the UPA. 160
Article 8 of the UPA deals specifically with gestational agreements, but
makes the enactment of Article 8 optional for the states because of the
various views on these agreements. 161 Further, the 2002revision
recognized that parties would continue to enter into these contracts,
which makes regulation essential. 162 Thus, the UPA offers two rulebased alternatives: either regulation through a judicial approval process,
or finding that “nonvalidated gestational agreements are unenforceable
(not void)[.]” 163 The judicial review process calls for the validation of
surrogacy contracts by a court prior to their enforceability. 164 This
process is similar to how an adoption is judicially approved, 165 and all
parties to the contract must consent to the terms. 166 The UPA is a good
example of a set of rules that have been created to address the surrogacy
contract because it uses general language that allows it to encompass
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changing technology, and provides two different options for states—
regulation or prohibition. 167
In contrast, the state of California has taken a different approach
to surrogacy contracts, allowing case law to give the legal directive in
Johnson v. Calvert. 168 In this case, the California Supreme Court set up
an “intent test” standard by which surrogacy contracts are judged. 169 At
the time, California had a version of the UPA; however, it did not
address surrogacy disputes. 170 In this case, the Calverts desired a child,
but Ms. Calvert was unable to conceive naturally. 171 One of her eggs was
fertilized by Mr. Calvert and implanted in the surrogate who eventually
gave birth to a child. 172 In contrast to the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Baby M, the California court first held that the agreement did not violate
California’s public policy. 173 Next, the court felt that both women
“presented acceptable proof of maternity,” thus, it looked to the “parties
intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.” 174 The court
concluded, “she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own—is the natural mother under California law." 175 Accordingly,
the child was given to the Calverts. 176 The dissent argued for the “best
interest of the child” standard. 177 This was rejected by the majority
because it was a more unstable analysis to use. 178
The range of legal directives regarding surrogacy contracts falls
somewhere in between the UPA and Calvert—some legislatures prohibit
or regulate these contracts, some leave it up to the courts, and some
doing nothing at all. 179 Whether future legal directives take the form of
rules or standards will be up to these decision makers.
PART IV: WHY SURROGACY CONTRACTS MAY BE BETTER
SUITED FOR RULE-BASED REGULATION
The decision to have a child is a highly personal and a highly
emotional one. The days following the birth of a child should be cause
See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 5, at 69; UNIFORM
LAW COMMISSION, PARENTAGE ACT SUMMARY, supra note 159.
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169 Id. at 782.
170 Id. at 778–79.
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for celebration, not litigation. However, the desire to have a child can
lead parents to take legal risks they normally would not consider
taking. 180 These risks include investing a large amount of money 181 and
time, 182 and entering into agreements that may or may not be
enforceable. 183 For the surrogate, there are considerable health risks
involved with multiple pregnancies and fertility drugs, as well as the risk
of not being compensated for their trouble—or goodwill. 184 One of the
ways to reduce risk is to increase certainty, and rules have an advantage
over standards in this respect. Uniform State Laws, like the UPA, bring
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law. 185 The UPA
recognizes that surrogacy agreements are going to continue being used
and that the legal parenthood of a child should not be in doubt. 186
The UPA also provides uniformity to the states and “addresses
the modern needs and concerns involved in parentage that have
developed due to advances in science and developments in the law over
the years.” 187 It recognizes that the law continues to fall behind the fastpace developments of medical science. 188 This is a situation that could
normally be addressed with standards that allow for recognition of new
technologies; however, the UPA addresses this situation by using general
language in its rules, and, at the same time defining what is covered and
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what is not covered, in order to give direction to decision makers. 189
Using this language, the UPA minimizes areas of uncertainty. Although
states do not have to adopt the UPA, states should consider adopting the
rule-based language used in the UPA because its generality provides for
flexibility to address changing technology while at the same time giving
direction for interpretation.
In addition to technological change, the notion of family itself is
also changing. 190 Flexible standards may allow the decision maker to
better acknowledge this change where static rules would be left behind.
However, this argument fails to recognize that evolving concepts are
limited by actual social values, which are reflected in the legal directives
already in place. 191 Generally, categorical rules can be created to mirror
society’s larger values. 192 Within the boundaries of these categorical
rules, social concepts like family are free to grow, shift, and evolve. If
that concept goes beyond the established boundary, one can surmise it is
outside societal values at that time and, therefore, not something that
should be encouraged.
Further, where standards are reactive by responding to change,
rules are proactive by anticipating change. The legislature, as the voice
189

4:
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(3) “Alleged father” means a man who
alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be,
the genetic father or a possible genetic
father of a child, but whose paternity has
not been determined. The term does not
include:
(A) a presumed father;
(B) a man whose parental rights
have been terminated or declared not
to exist; or
(C) a male donor.
(4) “Assisted reproduction” means a
method of causing pregnancy other than
sexual intercourse. The term includes:
(A) intrauterine insemination;
(B) donation of eggs;
(C) donation of embryos;
(D) in-vitro fertilization and
transfer of embryos; and
(E)
intracytoplasmic
sperm
injection.
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of the people, is equipped with enormous resources to anticipate change
and create rules that will not run the risk of obsolescence. The legislature
has the ability to balance competing interests, provide open debate, and
weigh all the factors before creating a new legal directive. As the notion
of what a family is and, more importantly, how a family is created
changes, rules can be promulgated through this process to anticipate and
reflect the larger societal values, which in turn will direct the change. 193
If clearly defined rules are in place, a couple seeking a child
through surrogacy will also have a better understanding of what to expect
from the legal system. If the state that the couple lives in allows
surrogacy contracts and regulates these contracts using rules, the couple
can enter into one with greater assurance that if they follow the rules they
will have a child of their own. 194 If the state prohibits surrogacy, the
couple can look to a legal forum with more favorable rules. 195
Situations involving third parties should also involve rules.
When only two parties are negotiating at arms-length, ambiguous
standards may work because the parties have the ability to interact and
understand one another. The inclusion of the third party, however,
creates a situation where rules are needed so everyone is on the same
page. As the number of parties grows, so does the need for rules.
Surrogacy contracts usually involve more than just the two couples; it
also includes attorneys, doctors, clinics, labs, and donors. 196 Rules help
to define everyone’s role in the process and to send clear messages as to
what is expected. Also, rules that specifically punish third parties deter
exploitation of the situation. 197 For example, an attorney who is subject
to rule-based sanctions will be less likely to stretch the law when it
contains a standard open to interpretation or creative contract making. 198
See Sanger, supra note 45, at 73–75 (providing a summary of changing
notions of parenthood from the 1950s to today).
194 See Hinson, supra note 118, at 34 (“Illinois is as good as it gets. It is the
single state that not only permits surrogacy, but also sets forth all the
enabling rules of the game, too. If you play by these rules, you get the golden
ticket: a declaration of legal parentage for the intended parents and a birth
certificate listing the parents as the sole legal parents without court
involvement.”)
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196 See Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (providing an example of the
number of parties that can be involved in situations involving a surrogacy
contract).
197 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 66.
198 D.C. Code § 16-402(b) (1981) (“Any person or entity who or which is
involved in, or induces, arranges, or otherwise assists in the formation of a
surrogate parenting contract for a fee, compensation, or other
remuneration, or otherwise violates this section, shall be subject to a civil
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Standards leave too much discretion in the hands of the decision
maker. The parties involved in surrogacy contracts will inevitably
become close to each other. Surrogacy contracts have been known to
include provisions regulating everything from eating habits of the
surrogate to when, and how often, she may have sex. 199 The nature of the
transaction practically demands this closeness. It is unreasonable to think
the parties would leave their fate to the decision of a third party who
knows nothing of the time, money, and emotional investments made over
nine months of pregnancy. In reality, the two parties would want to make
the decision themselves by following the rules laid out in their chosen
state.
Specific standards, such as balancing tests, the “intent test,” and
public policy, do not solve the uncertainty problem because “balancing
tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions
of those doing the balancing[.]” 200 The balancing test in surrogacy
contracts is often focused on the best interests of the child. 201 Forcing
two parties to plead their positions in front of a judge in the hopes that
the court will find the interests of the child are best served with them is
completely unreasonable. Presumably, the parties involved both have
stable homes, surrogates are usually mothers themselves and go through
a screening process, and the other party has the money to provide for a
child. Asking a judge to balance the competing interests leaves way too
much discretion in judge’s hands. This was the test used in Baby M and
was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Calvert. 202
The test adopted in Calvert—the “intent test” —is not much
better. 203 The Calvert court looked to the contract to ascertain intent.204
But even when the parties’ intent is stated in the contract, it is very
possible that intentions can change. It is the very reason litigation in
these cases arises. There are normally two sets of couples involved in
surrogacy cases, which means that there is a potential for four different
intentions. In some cases, the surrogate’s partner may not be as attached
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to the pregnancy and/or the child as the surrogate. 205 Without the bond
that is created while carrying a child for nine months, the surrogates
partner may balk if the surrogate changes her mind and wants to keep the
child. Further, it is not just the surrogate whose intentions may change.
The commissioning husband and wife may not enter the contract with
equal enthusiasm. 206 There is also the problem of a child who is born
handicapped or with some ailment that suddenly makes them less
attractive to one or both sets of parents. Ascertaining true intent in the
face of all these variables creates too much uncertainty.
Public policy rationale, like that used in Baby M, is also
uncertain. In general, the legislature is the policy-making branch. 207 The
courts are ill equipped to engage in public debate or hear the public input
that is needed to make public policy decisions because they lack both the
time and financial resources to needed to shape public policy. Because of
stare decisis, when courts do engage in public debate, the judiciary’s
version of public policy is imposed on individuals who are not even
parties to the lawsuit. 208 In contrast, when the legislature makes these
decisions in the normal course of legislative sessions, the general public
is put on notice. Seemingly, if two parties enter into a surrogacy contract,
in their mind, the contract does not run counter to public policy. Again, if
rules clearly prohibit this outcome, if the parties know to look for a
different forum, and if the rules allow it, the rule should define what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable. Judicial public policy
determinations do not give this kind of direction and, thus, should be
avoided.
CONCLUSION
Rules and standards as legal directives have advantages and
disadvantages that will work best in different situations. In the context of
surrogacy contracts, the biggest problem facing parties who wish to enter
into these contracts is uncertainty. Rules hold more promise than
standards in reducing uncertainty and, thus, are better suited for
application to surrogacy contracts. Therefore, current and future legal
Sanger, supra note 45, at 76 n.43 (citing Anne Taylor Fleming, Our
Fascination with Baby M, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 33)
(quoting a surrogate’ss boyfriend who stated that “[t]he baby means
absolutely nothing…we’re in it for the money[.]”).
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TECHNOLOGIES (2006))..
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directives aimed at regulating this area of the law should take the form of
rules.

